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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
NEGLIGENCE-MEDICAL MALPRACTICF,-STATUTE OF LIMITA-
TIONS STARTS TO RUN WHEN PATIENT COULD REASONABLY DISCOVER FOREIGN
OBJECT
In June, 1958, Josephine Flanagan was under the care of a doctor for a
gall bladder ailment. She entered the Mt. Eden General Hospital for an opera-
tion on July 14, 1958. During the operation surgical clamps were inserted into
her body, but were not removed. In June, 1966, she experienced abdominal
pains and consulted another doctor who discovered the clamps and success-
fully removed them. In separate actions against Mt. Eden General Hospital
and the estate of her original doctor, she alleged (1) that the clamps were left
in her body due to negligence during and after the operation and (2) that they
were not and could not have been discovered by her until June, 1966. The trial
court granted defendants' motions to dismiss on the ground that the actions
were barred by the statute of limitations.: The Appellate Division unanimously
affirmed without opinion.2 The Court of Appeals reversed. Held, the statute
of limitations does not begin to run in foreign-object medical malpractice ac-
tions until the plaintiff could have reasonably discovered the malpractice.
Flanagan v. Mt. Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301
N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969).
A person's right of action against one who has wronged him is not per-
petual; rather, it is specifically limited by statute.3 Statutes of limitations are
premised upon several factors: (1) the difficulty of proof of old, though mer-
itorious, claims; (2) the presumption that a plaintiff would not ordinarily delay
in pursuing a meritorious claim; (3) the possibility of fraudulent claims, and,
(4) the defendant's inability to defend against stale claims.4 At common-law
the statute of limitations did not commence until the action had "accrued."
This meant, in a negligence action, that all elements-duty, violation of duty,
1. N.Y. CPLR § 214 (McKinney 1963) "Actions to be commenced within three
years .... (6) An action to recover damages for malpractice." The history of § 214(6)
is long. By amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure, § 384(1) (N.Y. Sess. Laws 1900,
ch. 117, § 1) created "malpractice" as a separate cause of action. A two year limitation,
shorter than the three year limitation on a negligence action generally, applied to the mal-
practice action. Section 384(1) was the forerunner of the Civil Practice Act § 50(1),
which was the predecessor to CPLR § 214(6). Before the 1900 amendment, the action fell
under the Code of Civil Procedure § 383(5) (N.Y. Sess. Laws 1877, ch. 416, § 1), which
stipulated a three year limitation to bring a negligence action.
CPLR § 203(a) states: "LTjhe time within which an action must be commenced,
except as otherwise expressly prescribed, shall be computed from the time the cause of
action accrued to the time the claim was interposed."
2. Flanagan v. Mt. Eden Gen. Hosp., 29 AD.2d 920, 289 N.Y.S.2d 147 (4th Dep't
Memo. 1968). Hereinafter the Court of Appeals decision will be referred to as the instant
case.
3. In earlier times personal actions were thought to last until the plaintiff's death.
See Brooklyn Bank v. Barnaby, 197 N.Y. 210, 90 N.E. 834 (1910). Modern procedure
rules provide that the statute of limitations may be raised either as an affirmative defense
or in a motion to dismiss. In New York consult CPLR § 3018(b) and R 3211(a)(5).
4. Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Trans. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 302, 200 N.E. 824, 827-28,
(1936); N.Y. LAw REvisioN ComIn' REPORT 161 (1947); Developments in the Law:
Statites of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. Ry. 1177 (1949-50).
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proximate causation, and actual damage-had to be present.5 The action "ac-
crued" when the plaintiff's person was violated, whether or not the injury was
known to him.6 Legislatures, in following this principle, have failed to further
define when the cause of action has "accrued." 7 Thus, it has been left to the
courts to interpret the statutes. In a malpractice action, as in all tort actions,
a "traditional rule" has developed, that is, the statute of limitations begins to
run at the time of the negligent commission or omission of the act.8 The lead-
ing New York case, Conklin v. Draper,9 and cases following it, make it clear
that neither knowledge, actual damage, nor a presumption of damage is neces-
sary in order that the statute commence.
The courts in a growing number of states have set aside this traditional
accrual rule and have substituted a rule that the statute of limitations does
not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers, or by the exercise of reasonable
diligence, should have discovered that he had suffered an injury.10 Two states
have accepted this "discovery rule" by legislative enactment. 1 The federal
rule, adopted in Uric v. Thompson,12 suggests that the principle which focuses
upon the plaintiff's discovery of the injury rather than the defendant's com-
mission of the act is the only construction that is constitutionally proper.'
3
Where the courts have refrained from the discovery rule, the "continuous
treatment theory," the "contract action," and the "fraud action" have been
5. W. PROSSER, LAW OS' TORTS, 146-47 (3d ed. 1964).
6. Id.
7. N.Y. CPLR § 203(a) (McKinney 1963): "[Tlhe time within which an action must
be commenced, except as otherwise expressly prescribed, shall be computed from the time
the cause of action accrued to the time the claim is interposed." N.Y. LAW REVISION Com'N
REPORT 269, 283 (1962) and Lillich, The Malpractice Statute of Limitation in New York
and other Jurisdictions, 47 CoRixEu L.Q. 339, at 372 (1962), contain appendices of the
statutes of limitations of the other jurisdictions.
8. See, e.g., Pasquale v. Chandler, 250 Mass. 450, 215 N.E.2d 319 (1966); Schmidt v.
Merchants Despatch Trans. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936); Conklin v. Draper,
229 App. Div. 227, 241 N.Y.S. 529 (1930), aff'd, 254 N.Y. 620, 173 N.E. 892 (1930). Some
statutes have specifically stated that the statutory time begins running from the moment of
the negligent act or omission, but even then courts have postponed the time of its running.
Lillich, supra note 7 at 358-60.
9. 229 App. Div. 227, 241 N.Y.S. 529 (1930), aff'd, 254 N.Y. 620, 173 N.E. 892 (1930);
See Lillich, supra note 7 at 339-43 for a list of cases. Six years before the instant case, the
court re-affirmed the accrual rule of Conklin in a malpractice suit involving medication in
Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chemical Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 237 N.Y.S.2d
714 (1963).
10. See cases listed in the instant case at 431-32 nn. 1 & 2, 248 N.E.2d 871 at 873
nn. 1 & 2, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23 at 27 nn. 1 & 2.
11. 7 ALA. CODE § 25(1) (1958); 52 CoNx. GEN. STAT. REV. § 584 (1968). Each has
an outside limit within which the action must be brought. These are six and three years,
respectively. The brevity of the latter virtually negates the equity of the discovery rule
principle.
12. 337 U.S. 163, at 170- (1949). The Supreme Court pointed out that it was against
the policies underlying the statute of limitations to bar the plaintiff's action before he could
know he had an injury. By the court's interpretation an assumption lay behind statutes of
limitations "which conventionally require assertion of claims within a specified period of
time after notice of the invasion of legal rights."
13. Judge Desmond's dissenting opinion in Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chemical
Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1963), raised the question of
whether a right to an action could be taken away before one could know of its existence.
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used to avoid the traditional rule. The "continuous treatment theory" accepts
the maxim that the statute runs from the act or omission, but finds that the
negligent act "continues" until the end of the treatment of the patient.14 This
interpretation has similarly been applied to malpractice by attorneys.16 Its
drawback is that the theory is not available to those viable claims where no
post-operative or continued services were provided by the defendant. Under
the "contract action" theory, the plaintiff's complaint is based on the con-
tractual obligation between the doctor and patient instead of a theory of neg-
ligence, thus accounting for a longer statute of limitations.'0 Even though a
plaintiff may be successful in a contract action, he may be inadequately com-
pensated since contract damages do not include amounts for pain and suffer-
ing.17 A further problem is that although an action based on an express contract
may survive challenge, one based on an implied contract may be held to be
essentially a complaint in negligence and thereby limited by the statute of
limitations for malpractice.1 8 A plaintiff may take advantage of a "discovery
rule" if the action is based on a theory of fraud, since where fraud is involved
the statute of Jimitations does not begin to run until the injury is discovered.' 0
This theory has had little acceptance in New York since Tulloch v. Haselo,20
where the court held that a doctor's concealment of his malpractice was simply
part of his overall negligence and not a separate cause of action in fraud. It
has become almost impossible to successfully argue a fraud action where the
facts necessary to prove it would also establish an action in malpractice. 2 '
In the instant case, the court overruled Conklin v. Draper to the extent
that it applied to foreign-object medical malpractice. The court cautiously
removed the barrier against suits by plaintiffs suffering injuries due to foreign-
object medical malpractice. In allowing such actions the court thought that
the increased number of defendants subject to liability would be "in compatible
14. The theory was first established in New York in Sly v. Van Lengen, 120 Misc,
420, 198 N.Y.S. 608 (Sup. Ct. 1923); Note, 37 HARv. L. RaV. 272 (1923). In that case the
court adopted its principle from an Ohio precedent. Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106,
65 N.E. 865 (1902). The theory was streched to include independent and severable negligent
acts or omissions within a period of treatment in Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d
151, 187 N.E.2d 777, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1962). See Hammer v. Rosen, 7 N.Y.2d 376, 165
N.E.2d 756, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1960).
15. Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Penberthy, 301 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Sup. Ct. 1969). See
also, Statutes of Limitations in Legal Malpractice, 18 Civ.-MiAR. L. Rav. 82 (1969).
16. N.Y. CPLR § 213(2) (McKinney 1963) applies the six year statute of limitations
in actions based on a "contractual obligation or liability express or implied."
17. Katz, Medical Malpractice: A Survey of Statutes of Limitations, 3 SV'POLX U. L.
REv. 587, 603 (1969).
18. See e.g., Robins v. Finestone, 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E.2d 330 (1955); Calhotn v.
Gale, 29 A.D2d 766, 287 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2d Dep't Memo. 1968), aff'd, 23 N.Y,2d 756,
244 N.E.2d 468, 296 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1968); Colvin v. Smith, 276 App. Div. 9, 92 N.Y.S.2d
794 (1949); Saflan v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 260 App. Div. 765, 24 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1942),
aff'd, 286 N.Y. 649, 36 N.E.2d 692 (1941); Horowitz v. Bogart, 218 App. Div. 158, 217
N.Y.S. 881 (1926); Hertgen v. Weintraub, 29 Misc. 396, 215 N.Y.S.2d 379 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
19. N.Y. LAw REiVsIoI Co.MI'N REPORT 237, 250 (1962).
20. 218 App. Div. 313, 218 N.Y.S. 139 (1926).
21. N.Y. LAW RFvisioN Com:u'k REPORT 237, 251-52 (1962); Katz, supra note 17;
Lillich, supra note 7 at 365.
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harmony with the purpose for which the Statutes of Limitation were enacted." 22
Judge Keating, speaking for the majority, noted that these statutes of limita-
tions were never intended to protect the defendant from all old, but valid,
claims; rather, they were intended to avoid stale, unprovable, and frivolous
claims. The reasoning of the instant decision is that. the danger of false claims
is eliminated in this kind of malpractice because the claim "rests solely on the
presence of a foreign object. '23 The policy of insulating defendants from the
burden of defending stale claims is neither circumvented, nor unduly altered
where an action is allowed when the damaging item "retains its identity."24
The defendant's burden, in these situations does not outweigh the plaintiff's
right to a remedy.
By its emphasis on the nature of the injury, the majority creates a dis-
tinction, for the purpose of the statute of limitations, between one type of
medical malpractice and another. The emphasis upon the tangible object within
the plaintiff's body focuses on the plaintiff's ability to prove the injury's origin,
rather than the problem of knowing when the injury occurred. Only in the class
of foreign-object medical malpractice will the discovery rule principle be per-
mitted by the court. Medication malpractice, treatment malpractice and other
professional types of malpractice, which do not originate from a "foreign-
object" injury, may not, for purposes of applying the statute of limitations,
take advantage of the discovery rule principle. Based on this distinction the
court was able to uphold its recent decision in Schwartz v. Heyden Newport
Chemical Corp.25 involving medication malpractice, which followed the tradi-
tional rule of accrual enunciated in Conklin v. Draper.
Having narrowly limited the class of cases in which the discovery rule
principle would be allowed, it was not necessary for the court to establish an
outside time limit for bringing a claim so as to avoid a flood of suits. The
time to bring the action is postponed indefinitely, conditioned only on the dis-
coverability of the injury. In contrast to the majority rationale, the previous
recommendations of the New York Law Revision Commission have not dis-
tinguished types of malpractice, but have established an outside limit within
which to bring an action.26 Although the majority explicitly limited itself to
foreign-object medical malpractice, Judge Breitel's dissenting opinion accurately
noted that the majority's rule is equally applicable to other t~rpes of malprac-
tice.27 He acknowledged that:
[T]he same conclusions, for different reasons would probably apply
where a medical practioner fails to disclose the fact of treatment
22. Instant case at 430, 248 N.E.2d 871, at 872, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23, "at 26 (1969).
23. Id. "
24. Instant case at 431, 248 N.E.2d 871, at 873, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23, at 27.
25. 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 NX..2d 142, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714"'(1963).
26. See N.Y. LAW REvisioN Cdi:'N REPORT 139, 142 (1942); N.Y. LAw REVISION
COMmN ,xEORT 227, 233 (1962).
27. Instant case at 436, 248 NYE.2d 871, at 876, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23, at 31.
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malpractice either known to him or inferable to him from the conse-
quences of a treatment of surgical procedure.
28
Speaking for three dissenting judges, Breitel's objection was that the court had
invaded an area which he considered wholly controlled by the legislature.29
One justification for applying the discovery rule, touched upon by both
the majority and dissent, is that the "lack of knowledge" of the plaintiff's in-
jury ought to be a reason for delaying the running of the statute of limitations
against him. The majority, quoting a West Virginia case, acknowledged that
It simply places an undue strain upon common sense, reality,
logic and simple justice to say that a cause of action had 'accrued'
to the plaintiff until the X-ray examination disclosed a foreign object
within her abdomen and until she had reasonable basis for believing
or reasonable means of ascertaining that the foreign object was within
her abdomen .... 30
Perhaps, only this element of knowledge can realistically justify the discovery
principle.
The major failing of the instant case is that it distinguished one type of
medical malpractice from another. In distinguishing Schwartz v. Heyden New-
port Chemical Corp.31 the court denied that the discovery principle is appli-
cable to medication malpractice, treatment malpractice, or any other professional
malpractice. Schwartz should have been overruled explicitly. In fact, two
weeks before the Flanagan case was decided, the Oregon Supreme Court ruled
in a medical-treatment malpractice case that:
On a theoretical basis it is impossible to justify the applicability
of the discovery rule to one kind of malpractice and not another.
The reason for the application of the discovery rule is the same in
each instance. . . . This is true whether it consists of leaving a
foreign object in the body or whether it consists of faulty diagnosis
or treatment.
32
Had the New York Court of Appeals faced the Schwartz case squarely, it
would have reached a similar conclusion. Nevertheless, the Flanagan decision
28. Id.
29. Id. Breitel asserted that the failure of the legislature to act affirmatively on pro-
posals for a discovery rule since 1942 is a clear indication of legislative intent against It.
While he was correct in stating that this is an area where the legislature could act, e.g., as
it has in establishing the discovery rule in fraud actions, his reasoning presented a fallacious
picture of the legislative process, See Keeton, Judicial Law Reform-A Perspective on the
Performrance of Appellate Courts, 44 TtcAs L. Rr v. 1284, 1262 (1966). The majority ap-
proached the realities of the situation by pointing out that the discovery rule applies to
when the statute of limitations begins to run. When it runs is only stated generally in the
Civil Practice Law and Rules, since the "traditional rule" is a judicial creature. The
majority also correctly noted that the failure of the legislature to act cannot be taken as
absolute proof of intent to keep the Conklin decision frozen. Instant case at 433, 248 N.E.2d
871, at 874, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23, at 28.
30. Morgan v. Grace Hosp., 149 W. Va. 783, 144 S.E.2d 156 (1967) quoted in instant
case at 431, 248 N.E.2d 871, at 873, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23, at 27.
31. 12 N.Y.S.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1963).
32. Frohs v. Greene, 452 P.2d 864, 565 (Ore. 1969).
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has probably undermined the policy reasons for remaining with Schwartz in the
future.
Whether the decision will be applied to other malpractice is not clear.
Certainly the equities are no less demanding when the plaintiff is injured by
an injection, 3 by a surveyor's careless measurements,3 4 or by an attorney's
failure to act before a statute of limitations barred his client's claim. 5 Sig-
nificantly, these various types of malpractice have been covered by the New
York statute of limitations for malpractice.3 6 A lower court decision after
Flanagan suggests that the discovery principle may not be applied to other
professional malpractice. In May, 1969, a trial court in Marine Midland
Trust Co. v. Penberthy37 applied the "continuous treatment theory" 8 to a
legal malpractice situation. Thus, the traditional rule for the running of the
statute still exists in one type of relationship but not another even though the
same equitable issues arise. Until a similar malpractice case comes before the
Court of Appeals again, New York will have to be content with a very limited
discovery rule. In light of the twenty years of Law Revision Commission rec-
ommendations and decisions in other jurisdictions, the Court of Appeals should
certainly uphold the majority rationale and, upon reconsideration of the issues,
expand the scope of the rule to include all undiscovered malpractice.
JERomE D. Scm
NEGLIGENCE-PERSONAL INJURY-GENx L RELEASE SUBJECT TO
REscissioN WHERE PARTIEs ARE MISTAxEN ABOUT TEE EXTENT AND EXIST-
ENCE OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES
Infant plaintiff, injured in an automobile accident, was examined by three
doctors and then assured that the only injury that resulted was to her lower
spine. Since the date of injury she had complained of pain radiating down the
back of her posterior left thigh and a "clicking" sound in the region of her left
hip. Her counsel settled her claim for $1,000 and prepared general releases
relinquishing "all claims for personal injuries, medical expenses, loss of wages
(claims for expenses and loss of service) as a result of an automobile accident
on February 26, 1963." Six months later she was again examined by a doctor
who stated that the accident had caused an additional injury, an avascular
33. Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chemical Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2a 142,
237 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1963).
34. Seger v. Cornwell, 44 Misc.2d 994, 255 N.Y.S.2d 744 (Sup. Ct. 1964). The court
viewed Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chemical Corp. as controlling.
35. Siegel v. Kranis, 52 Misc.2d 78, 274 N.Y.S.2d 968 (Sup. Ct. 1966). The court
applied the traditional rule and held that "New York takes the view that fraudulent con-
cealment does not toll the statute of limitations." Id. at 80, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 970.
36. See supra note 1 for statutory history.
37. 301 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
38. See supra note 14.
